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FOREWORD: THE LEGACY OF CHANCELLOR KENT
HAROLD J. KRENT*

This symposium commemorates the two hundredth anniversary
of James Kent's ascension to the bench. Few other figures in our
nation's history have captured the legal imagination to the same
extent as Kent.1 As professor, judge, and author, Kent devoted his life
to law and pedagogy, and his work profoundly shaped the course of
law in the new Republic. His mammoth treatise on American law,
Kent's Commentaries, not only was the first full-fledged effort in this
country, but also was the most extensively used throughout the
nineteenth century, and is still widely cited today. Kent's
Commentaries carved out space for the emergence of a uniquely
American law, yet one built firmly upon the English common law
tradition. His institution of the reporting system in New York set the
standard that other states emulated, helping to make law a more
learned profession. His efforts to ensure judicial independence blazed
an enduring path for state court judges between the Scylla of federal
court expansion and the Charybdis of state political controls.
This law school honors Kent's memory through its name. The
late nineteenth century witnessed a dramatic expansion in the
number of law schools as the apprenticeship model of legal education
lost support and as the demand for part-time education increased.
Law school became an avenue not merely for those wishing enhanced
2
education, but also for those wishing social and economic mobility.
In 1892, Professor Marshall Ewell left Northwestern to start a
new school, in part because he believed that Northwestern failed to
focus sufficiently on preparing students for legal practice. 3 The
invocation of Kent's name reinforced Ewell's firm conviction of the
* Professor and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. John Marshall is the exception. To commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of his
ascension to the bench, a national celebration was planned and a "John Marshall" day
proclaimed. See Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 151,

208-11 (1998).
2. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980s, at 73-84 (1983).
3. See Milton 0. Naramore, Secretary's Report, in CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 2, 1894, at
634.
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lasting power of the legal method reflected in Kent's Commentaries.4
Many other law schools of the era were named after leading historical
figures. In addition to Kent and John Marshall, schools were named
after Andrew Jackson,5 Abraham Lincoln,6 and John M. Langsten.7
The Kent College of Law merged with the Chicago College of Law in
1900, and the combined schools became a critical training ground for
Chicago's bustling population of immigrants. In addition, the school
was among the first to open doors to African Americans and women.
This school has flourished, even while schools named after
Jackson, Neal, Langsten, and even John F. Kennedy8 have either
merged with others or closed their doors. Demographics, finance, and
strategic planning undoubtedly determined which law schools
survived; and, indeed, the Kent College of Law in Nashville closed its
doors in 1940.9 But perhaps it is not too whimsical to suggest that
Kent's name may have played a role as well in the longevity of this
school. The Kent name brings universal respect: two other
universities, Columbia and Yale, have named prestigious chairs in his
memory.
The articles in this symposium address many different legal
issues, as is only fitting given Kent's wide-ranging interests and
profound influence on the development of the law. Chief Judge
Judith S. Kaye of the Court of Appeals of New York, who occupies
the same position as did Chancellor Kent almost two hundred years
ago, contributes a delightful biographical sketch. 10 The article focuses
on the development of Kent's legal practice and legal outlook. She
focuses on his establishment, while he was on the bench, of a reporter
system for New York Supreme Court cases; his opinions on equity as
Chancellor; and his work on his famed treatise. Relying on primary
source material, the article illumines the course of a giant in
4. Ewell focused the new school's energies on blending theoretical and practical training.
See Marshall D. Ewell, Kent College of Law, 6 BENCH & BAR 638, 639 (1896).
5. See STEVENS, supra note 2, at 201 n.31.
6. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE
LAW 429 (1921). One school named for Lincoln was located, appropriately enough, in
Springfield, Illinois. See id. Others were in Pennsylvania and elsewhere in Illinois. See id. at 42529.
7. The Langsten Law School was part of Frelinghuysen University in the District of
Columbia and attracted African-American students. See STEVENS, supra note 2, at 195.
Langsten was a distinguished educator in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
8. The John F. Kennedy law school was located in California. See id. at 244.
9. See id. at 201 n.31.
10. See Judith S. Kaye, Commentaries on Chancellor Kent, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11
(1998).
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American legal history.
Three of the symposium contributions focus on judicial
independence. As a member of the New York Supreme Court and
former state representative, Kent was zealous in defending the
independence of the judiciary.
In a jointly authored article,1" Emily Van Tassel and Charles
Geyh focus on the contemporary history of one aspect of the judicial
independence that Kent cherished: the judiciary's structural
independence in the face of encroachments from the legislative and
executive branches that could have undermined the judiciary's ability
to perform a valuable checking function. 12 The authors start in the
period during the Revolutionary War, which they and others have
argued was marked by excessive judicial dependence on the newly
independent state legislatures. Judges escaped the control of the
Crown only to become subservient to the legislatures. During that
period, judges were subject to salary cuts and often could be removed
upon vote of the state legislature. The authors next show how these
concerns underlay much of the debates during the Constitutional
Convention that ultimately led to enactment of the familiar Article
III tenure and salary protections. They suggest that the delegates did
not address other potential problems, such as congressional
regulation of jurisdiction, simply because they could not have
foreseen future legislative incursions on judicial independence.
The authors then address the tensions that arose in the new
Republic after enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Creating
inferior federal courts was not seen as a means of regulating the
judiciary so much as a way to counteract the power of state courts
when federal interests were at stake. Moreover, judges during that
period recognized potential threats to their structural independence
stemming from circuit riding duties, imposition of administrative
duties under the 1792 Invalid Pension Act, and finally President
Adams' court-packing plan of 1801. The authors conclude that the
early history of our Republic affords no ammunition to those intent
11. See Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial
Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31 (1998).
12. Oddly enough, New York at the time had a Council of Revision under which the
Chancellor of Equity sat with the Governor of New York and members of the supreme court to
review all bills enacted by the state legislature to ensure not only that the bills were
constitutional but also that they were "consistent with the public good." See John H. Langbein,
ChancellorKent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 563 (1993). New
York abolished the Council in 1821, but Kent apparently did not strenuously object to its
composition or duties. See id.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

on limiting the judiciary's structural independence today.
Michael Gerhardt examines Chancellor Kent's view of judicial
independence with respect to the conditions under which judges can
be impeached. 3 Surprisingly, Kent believed judges could be
impeached for improvident opinions. He wrote that the impeachment
mechanism represented a critical check on judicial abuse of authority.
How, Professor Gerhardt asks, can that view on impeachment be
squared with Kent's overall view of the importance of the judiciary's
structural independence?
Gerhardt locates the answer, interestingly enough, in Kent's
evident assumption that the law of impeachment would develop in a
common law type fashion. Over time, principles as to when and why
impeachment proceedings could proceed would crystallize, limiting
Congress's ability to use impeachment as a means to undermine
judicial independence. Gerhardt examines judicial impeachment
cases in an effort to determine why no common law rules have arisen
delineating the actus reus and mens rea elements of impeachment.
The political nature of impeachment, in tandem with the paucity of
cases in our history, have prevented any such rules from emerging.
Ultimately, Gerhardt argues, Kent must have believed that judicial
review itself would be available to restrain any legislative abuse of the
impeachment remedy. 14 That expectation has not materialized during
the admittedly sparse history of impeachment proceedings.
Erwin Chemerinsky investigates another obstacle facing judicial
independence, namely, the corruption intrinsic to the electoral
process.15 Although Kent never had to face an election, the vast
majority of judges today confront the necessity to raise money and
win elections. Chemerinsky notes first that state court judges must
rely upon campaign contributions to fund elections, whether
conventional adversary contests or retention elections. The money
comes from lawyers who will appear before the judges or from firms
whose interests the judges will consider. The impact upon the
decisional impartiality that Kent valued so highly can be devastating.
Chemerinsky concludes, therefore, that campaign restrictions should
13. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Chancellor Kent and the Search for the Elements of Impeachable
Offenses, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91 (1998).
14. See also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (refusing to consider Judge
Nixon's assertion that the Senate violated the Constitution in delegating his impeachment trial
to a committee).
15. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133 (1998).
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be imposed on judicial elections, and that the Supreme Court should
uphold both expenditure and contribution restrictions against First
Amendment attack given the compelling state interest in judicial
impartiality. 6 No other means, whether case-by-case recusal or
disclosure requirements, Chemerinsky argues, can as effectively
minimize the potential and appearance of corruption.
Susanna Blumenthal addresses not the question of judicial
independence but of judicial reputation in the nineteenth century.17
Conventional wisdom suggests that judges at the time were viewed as
law finders, not makers. Independence was required to ensure that
the judicial craft be pursued faithfully, if mechanically. Blumenthal
shatters the notion that judges were perceived so narrowly. Drawing
upon legal pamphlets, judicial biographies, and eulogies as her
primary sources, she argues that judges, at least by the middle of the
nineteenth century, were respected and lauded for their creativity in
applying doctrine. She suggests that society in this early period of our
history viewed judges through a lens of romanticism, a movement
prevalent in the literature and music of the period. Judges were not
regarded merely as ciphers or as mechanical interpreters of the law,
but rather lionized as enlightened lawmakers. The judicial craft
permitted and even encouraged innovation and creativity. Kent
indeed became a role model against which to assess other judicial
lives.
Two contributions focus on Kent's pivotal role in disseminating
legal information more widely. Kent was highly influential in setting
in motion a reporting system for state supreme court cases which not
only made the opinions available to more attorneys, but also created
an incentive for judges to write more learned opinions. Moreover, his
treatise helped spread legal information by collecting and analyzing
such extensive legal authority in one publication, 18 just as Blackstone
had done with English law.
G. Edward White examines the unparalleled success of the
Commentaries to capture the public's imagination and pocketbooks in
the nineteenth century.' 9 After all, Justice Holmes, even while
16. The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), frames the proper
inquiry, and only a showing of compelling state interest can save the constitutionality of any
such restriction.
17. See Blumenthal, supra note 1.
18. The Commentaries were wildly popular by the standard of the day and may have
earned more money than any other book during the middle of the nineteenth century. See
Langbein, supra note 12, at 566.
19. See G. Edward White, The Chancellor'sGhost, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229 (1998).
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preparing the twelfth edition of the Commentaries, quipped that Kent
"has no general ideas, except wrong ones,' 20 and many commentators
today agree. White presents several examples in the Commentaries
that reflect what we would consider to be "wrongheadedness" or
worse.
Nonetheless, Kent's influence was widespread and the
Commentaries were revered for several generations after his death.21
White suggests that, contemporary sensibilities notwithstanding, Kent
excelled in combining an ability to present the law as it was with
refined commentary drawing upon divergent legal sources from all
over the world. Kent's Commentaries succeeded not only because the
treatise pulled extensive legal materials together in one publication,
but also because Kent lent the materials such thoughtful analysis,
even if the analyses are ones that we would reject today as superficial
or result-oriented. Kent reserved for the legal commentator a critical
role in stating what the law was and then in refining the law. His
commentary could improve the emerging American law consistent
with developing mores of the era without exposing the political
nature of judging. His role as treatise writer fell within the didactic
traditions of academicians or savants from other disciplines. What
distinguished Kent from other writers therefore was his ability to
make his Commentaries synonymous with the emerging American
law itself.
Denis Duffey focuses on the innovation of the printed case
report.2 2 He argues that the impetus for case reporting arose from two
reform efforts internal to the judiciary: first, the desire to make clear
the differences between common law in the States and that in
England; and second, the goal of making judicial decision making in
the new states more uniform.
Duffey then argues that, despite the original impetus, case
reporting provided an unanticipated defense of common law
authority in the face of republican sentiment.2 3 Many leaders of the
time identified the common law with England and therefore were
suspicious of its continued role in the new Republic. Printed decisions
20. Id. at 226.
21. When The Chicago College of Law was formed, which would soon merge with the Kent
College of Law, Kent's Commentaries were required reading. See CHICAGO COLLEGE OF LAW,
ANNUAL CATALOGUE 1889-90, at 8 (1889).
22. See Denis P. Duffey, Jr., Genre and Authority: The Rise of Case Reporting in the Early
United States, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 263 (1998).
23. See also Langbein, supra note 12, at 567-68.
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led to greater transparency. Editorials were written, and judges
attacked for their decisions. The very debate, however, lent the
impression that common-law making was subject to wider public
participation and in fact could be shaped by civic discourse.
Moreover, the printed reports afforded the legal profession a
common American literature for the first time, thereby enhancing
respect for the profession. Thus, increased case reporting helped
insulate the common law tradition from possible legislative reformist
efforts and afforded judges more legitimacy in the public eye.
Finally, in an afterward,2 4 Penny White reflects upon the judicial
qualities that Kent manifested in office.1 Foremost, she argues, Kent
was a judge of integrity, refusing to be drawn into partisan disputes
despite the possibility for future advancement. She also avers to his
tremendous learning and intellectual acumen. His lectures and
opinions reveal a great breadth and depth of knowledge. In addition,
she addresses, as does Professor G. Edward White, Kent's gift of
communication, both in his opinions and in his Commentaries. White
also stresses Kent's commitment to the profession. He labored
arduously and effectively to enhance the prestige and competence of
both the New York Supreme Court and Court of Chancery. She
concludes that "Chancellor Kent was the paradigm of a good
judge.... His legacy for today's judges is to set the bar which they
'26
should all aspire to scale.
The contributions to this symposium reflect Chancellor Kent's
varied talents as well as his profound influence on the development of
American law. Kent's legacy rests with his treatise, with his successful
efforts to introduce a professional reporting system, and with his
erudite judicial decisions. This school proudly bears his name and
strives to combine his interest in legal pedagogy with his pioneering
efforts to disseminate legal information more widely.

24. Professor White, former Associate Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court, delivered
these remarks at a colloquium honoring Chancellor Kent. Also participating were Larry Lessig
and G. Edward White.
25. See Penny J. White, Master, Justice, Chancellor Kent: His Legacy for Today's Judges, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 277 (1998).
26. Id. at 274-75.

